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SAID, LUKÁCS, AND GRAMSCI:BEGINNINGS, 
GEOGRAPHY, AND INSURRECTION
CONOR McCARTHY
This essay advances two agendas simultaneously. The first is to intervene in 
the developing debates about the relationship between Edward Said’s work and 
various strands of Marxism. The second is to examine the dialectics of historical 
and geographical thinking in his work. These two vectors within Said’s work 
meet in the ways in whichhe deployed ideas taken from the last great Western 
Marxist revolutionaries, Georg Lukács and Antonio Gramsci.
It is worth saying that Said’s readings of Lukács, Gramsci, and indeed other 
Western Marxist writers in whom he expressed interest, such as Raymond 
Williams, Fredric Jameson, and most prominently Theodor Adorno, are not 
beyond debate or question. My primary approach here will be to see what Said 
does with the two Marxist writers he cites most often: to offer an account of 
the work he accomplishes with them, not to check if he is consistently or correctly 
“Lukácsian” or “Gramscian.” By way of a start, it is worth noting again Said’s 
best-known declaration of his relationship to critical Marxism as he set it out in 
the early 1980s. In “Secular Criticism,” the opening essay of The World, the Text, 
and the Critic, he writes that “right now in American cultural history, ‘Marxism’ 
is principally an academic, not a political, commitment. It risks becoming an 
academic subspeciality.” In the absence of substantial left-wing movements 
organized on a national scale in America, there is not the wider public culture 
or alternative public sphere to which a Marxist criticism could properly affiliate 
itself. Rather, Said declares, he has been “more influenced by Marxists than by 
Marxism or any other ism” (1983, 28–29). What we take from this is that while 
Said reads Marxist critics keenly, he is more interested in their individuality than 
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in their place within or contribution to Marxism as a body of doctrine that is 
deeper or wider than its adherents, and that his readings and appropriations of 
Marxist writers are and will be openly heterodox.
Said was mostly explicit about his interest in Lukács and Gramsci. In the 
last pages of his memoir, Out of Place, he refers to his encounters at Harvard 
with Lukács’s History and Class Consciousness and Giambattista Vico’s New Science 
(alongside his immersion in the work of Heidegger, Merleau-Ponty, and Sartre) 
as having been for him “momentous events” (Said 1999, 290). Lukács is also cited 
in Said’s first book, Joseph Conrad and the Fiction of Autobiography (1966), while the 
presence of Gramsci in Said’s work becomes explicit in the middle to late 1970s, 
most obviously in Orientalism (1979). Most Said commentary notes this. What is 
more rarely alluded to is the interplay and movement between these two writers 
in Said’s work, and it is this pattern that I will concentrate on here.
The conjuncture of Lukács, Vico, and such writers as Merleau-Ponty in 
Said’s early career can be seen retrospectively as putting in place some of the 
coordinates within which the eventual interplay of Lukács and Gramsci would 
occur. If later in his career, as we shall see, Said was keen to point out the spatial 
or geographical character of Gramsci’s thought, then we can identify a certain 
predisposition toward such thinking in his interest in the spiral historicism of 
Vico, with its ascription of a looping recursive pattern to the historical process 
and its concept of the individual corsi taken by nations in their movement from 
primitivism to civilization. We must also note here, if only briefly, that one of 
Said’s most famous qualifications for criticism —its “worldliness” or its presence 
in “the world”—emerges at least partly from his interest not only in the Geneva 
School of phenomenological criticism, but also in Merleau-Ponty himself. In a 
very early essay, “Labyrinth of Incarnations,” Said reviews Merleau-Ponty’s The 
Primacy of Perception, and establishes as fundamental the French philosopher’s 
conception of “the world”:
Merleau-Ponty’s central philosophic position, insofar as one can be articulated for 
him, is that we are in and of the world before we can think about it. Perception, 
to which he devoted his major philosophic labors, is a crucial but complex process 
that reasserts our connection with the world and thereby provides the basis for all 
our thought and meaning-giving activity. (Said 2000, 4)
If Sartre had declared that human beings were condemned to freedom, then 
Merleau-Ponty, Said notes, argues that we are condemned to the production of 
meaning. When Merleau-Ponty coins the term “the world’s prose,” he means that 
human interaction with the world is an inherently interpretative process: we 
express or give expression to the world, endlessly, productively. Yet this is also 
something to which we are condemned: interacting with the world, there is no 
final or single or definitive meaning to be ascertained, only further perception. 
Merleau-Ponty, contrary to appearances, does not represent an exorbitance of 
subjectivity, but neither is he willing to concede the determination of mind by 
material structures and circumstances in the manner that Marxist thought might 
suggest. In pointing to Merleau-Ponty’s rejection of Herbert Marcuse’s diagnosis 
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of “one-dimensional man”—the reification and hollowing-out of subjectivity and 
individuality—Said hints at the torsions and ambiguities of his relationship with 
Marxism to come (Marcuse 1991). Finally, Said quotes Merleau-Ponty in terms 
that can be read as a description of his own later critical self:
Every historical undertaking is something of an adventure since it is never 
guaranteed by any absolutely rational structure of things. . . . Our only recourse 
is a reading of the present which is as full and as fruitful as possible, which does 
not prejudice its meaning, which even recognizes chaos and non-sense where they 
exist, but which does not refuse to discern a direction and an idea in events where 
they appear. (Quoted in Said 2000, 10)
We can then turn to later, mature work and find the same or similar motifs 
reappearing, like the watermark on a banknote. In his essay “The World, the 
Text, and the Critic,” originally published in 1975, we find Said declaring that 
“rather than being defined by the silent past, commanded by it to speak in the 
present, criticism . . . is the present in the course of its articulation” (Said 1983, 
51). And then in “Traveling Theory,” originally published in 1982, we see that 
criticism is most of all “an unstoppable predilection for alternatives” (1983, 247). 
In other words—and this theme would appear in and be reinforced by Said’s 
appropriation of Lukács—criticism helps a society and a culture to renew itself, 
to break with its pasts, to project and anticipate futures.
Said’s first book, on Conrad, was the only conventional single-author study 
he wrote. In it he mines Conrad’s letters and short fiction to examine from a 
phenomenological perspective the aesthetic strategies the Polish exile devised 
in his writing to deal with his own profound alienation and self-division. 
Unquestionably, Conrad’s life and his ways of dealing with it in writing spoke 
to Said’s own. The singular status of this book, at the start of Said’s oeuvre, may 
be because a repeated theme of his work thereafter would be the devising of 
theoretical—as against aesthetic—strategies for dealing with the conditions of 
self-division, alienation, and deracination which Conrad describes so well. This 
is worked out in important ways in Said’s major books: Beginnings, Orientalism, The 
Question of Palestine, The World, the Text, and the Critic, and Culture and Imperialism. 
I will consider those books now.
Just a year after the publication of Joseph Conrad and the Fiction of Autobiography 
([1966] 2008), the June War (or 1967 Arab-Israeli War) radically redrew the map 
of the Middle East. Most importantly for Said, Israel now gained control of 
the remainder of historical Palestine: in a strong sense, “Palestine” had finally 
disappeared. Not only that, but Israel had wrested significant territory from 
both Syria and Egypt (the Golan Heights and the Sinai), and dealt those two 
major Arab powers a severe defeat. With their defeat came also the defeat of 
the pan-Arabism represented by Gamal Abdel Nasser, with all of the hopes and 
aspirations for both the Palestinians and for the Arab peoples generally that were 
contained within it. Any hope of a “return” to natal Palestinian origins was now 
impossible for Said, literally and also philosophically. The Conradian dilemmas 
of alienation and exile were formidably reinforced. To think around or beyond 
them became the crucial project.
Therefore, the book Said started work on in the late 1960s was always likely 
to have a political valence. Furthermore, he had started work on the great Irish 
poet and polemicist Jonathan Swift before he moved on to what would become 
Beginnings (1985). In that book, Said discusses at considerable length the matter of 
critical as well as fictional beginnings, one of his primary resources being Georg 
Lukács. We’ll find here that the point is less that Said practiced a Lukácsian 
literary criticism but that in his ways of preparing for criticism he became 
(arguably) a Lukácsian revolutionary critical intellectual. What is interesting for our 
purposes here is how the ideas taken from Lukács are then reinflected by way of 
the work of Gramsci.
Said’s appropriation of Lukács in Beginnings works in at least two ways. These 
are marked by two crucial books in Lukács’s oeuvre, Theory of the Novel (1971b)
and History and Class Consciousness (1971a) respectively. What is striking in regard 
to Lukács’s career is that these books bridge his movement from neo-Kantianism 
to an immersion in Marxism, and from a relatively contemplative intellectual 
stance to communist revolutionism. In Theory of the Novel, Lukács famously 
characterizes the novel as the epic of a world abandoned by God and as a form 
marked by “transcendental homelessness” (1971b, 88, 41). But Said compares the 
situation of the critic to that of the novelist: 
So the critic faces irregularity on all sides. Because he cannot have direct recourse 
to tradition in solving the problems of writers like Joyce, and because his (and 
Joyce’s) references are to other makeshift formalities of knowledge, the critic is 
aptly characterized in Lukács’s epithet for the novel as being transcendentally 
homeless. He begins each work as if it were a new occasion. His beginning, as 
much as any modern writer’s beginning, takes up a subject in order to begin it, 
keep it going, create it. As the beginning is related to what immediately follows 
it, so too are the parts of his writing to one another—irregularly, assertively, 
eccentrically. (Said 1985, 11)
Here Said is using Lukács’s insight about the novel to make a point about his 
idea of criticism. Just as the modernist novelist seeks to assert a break or rupture 
between her work and what has come before, so Said’s critic adopts an anti-
dynastic position or attitude vis-à-vis the critical tradition: she seeks neither to 
place herself in an illustrious lineage of scholarship nor to set up a new orthodoxy 
that will persist in her wake. In the manner of a Vichian autodidact, she realizes 
that every new project she undertakes will be, and will necessitate, a new beginning. 
Just as Lukács sees the novel as the epic of the modern age, so Said sees criticism 
as a fundamentally modern and modernist activity: it is a nonlinear, decentered 
process. It is, to return to the Lukácsian metaphor, “homeless”—not necessarily 
in the sense that criticism must have a literal empirical or physical home, but 
rather it is “homeless” in the world of language and writing, restless, perpetually 
reinventing itself, perpetually starting anew, perpetually re-examining and 
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reinstating its own conditions of possibility. For Said at this point, this is a both 
an alienating and an enabling condition.
In the “Meditation on Beginnings,” Said discusses “beginning” through 
a number of sources: Auerbach, Marx, Freud, Vico, and Lukács. “Beginnings” 
are explored in philosophical, literary, and linguistic terms. Said notes first that 
merely to think of beginnings is to retroject oneself in order to examine the 
conditions of such thought. His first example is Swift, of whom he suggests:
In his political writings, who more than Swift the hard-nosed pamphleteer wanted 
readers to see things clearly from the beginning—meaning that he wanted to 
reverse the ruinous trend of European war policy and the cancerous growth in the 
English language of cant and neologism? (Said 1985, 30)
Noting Swift’s blistering attacks on political language, Said shows that for him 
the classically simple is eminent because it is what came first, and so beginning 
has eminence: “The beginning as first point in a given continuity has exemplary 
strength equally in history, in politics and in intellectual discipline” (1985, 32). 
The point is that Swift is as interested in beginnings in language as in politics, 
and sees the two as related. Simplicity is related to anteriority, which is in turn 
related to authority.
Said then suggests that to identify a beginning is to make an act of historical 
understanding. Further, he writes: “Let us then formulate this general definition 
for any beginning that involves reversal, change of direction, the institution of 
a durable movement that increasingly engages our interest; such a beginning 
authorizes: it constitutes an authorization for what comes after it” (1985, 34). 
Beginnings are “worldly” events, whether in politics or discourse: one beginning 
forecloses on another. For the writer or historian or theorist, beginnings emerge 
“reflectively” and “unhappily,” already engaging the writer in a sense of their 
“difficulty” (35).
Said then moves on to a consideration of language in relation to beginnings, 
and he does this with the assistance of Saussure and Nietzsche. With Saussure he 
notes that language will be both the object and the medium of the investigation 
into beginnings. With Nietzsche, more polemically, he accepts that concepts are 
“anthropomorphisms” (quoted in Said 1985, 39): projections of the human mind, 
which enable the production of knowledge. Language is principally a means 
of differentiation—it helps us to distinguish objects, though also to establish 
continuity—but it also projects human needs onto knowledge, which then acts 
back on human beings. Said then quotes a famous passage from Nietzsche’s early 
essay “Truth and Lies in a Non-Moral Sense”:
What then, is truth? A mobile army of metaphors, metonyms, and 
anthropomorphisms—in short a sum of human relations which have been 
enhanced, transposed, and embellished poetically and rhetorically, and which 
after long use seem firm, canonical, and obligatory to a people: truths are illusions 
about which one has forgotten that this is what they are; metaphors which are 
worn out and without sensuous power; coins which have lost their pictures and 
now matter only as metal, no longer as coins. (Quoted in Said 1985, 39)
If this sounds like so much nihilistic relativism, Said defends Nietzsche from 
the reflex or glib application of such a charge. Nietzsche, he says in a memorable 
phrase, helps us investigate “the charlatanry of reason,” a necessary element in 
the investigation, and positing, of beginnings (1985, 39).
However, Said is not interested in abandoning reason: rather, he is pursuing 
a radicalized, border version of it. He cites Gaston Bachelard’s L’engagement 
rationaliste approvingly: “One must return to human rationality its function 
as a force for turbulence and aggression” (quoted in Said 1985, 40). Therefore, 
his wish is to “use reason as a means of setting tasks, to generate thought in 
order to activate itself beyond the bounds and limits set by the mere historical 
conventions of reason.” The duty of such reason is to “regain hold of those forms, 
altogether purified and made economically functional by logicians, and fill them 
psychologically, put them back into life and motion.” Most daring of all, if “during 
an experiment, one does not risk one’s reason, then that experiment is not worth the attempt” 
(quoted in Said 1985, 40; emphasis in original).
How should we gloss these ideas? “Beginning” is an issue in any intellectual 
project—be that writing a novel, or engaging in philosophical critique or political 
insurrection, whether we like it or not. The point is to engage with this issue 
reflexively, folding it back into the project itself. Because it involves a recursive 
leap backward in thinking of one’s work, it involves historical interpretation and 
reversal. It serves both to create difference (the difference of this project or action 
as against that one) and continuity—a beginning authorizes that which comes 
after it. In that sense, beginning is an act of power: it is a matter of authorizing 
that move and not this one. The medium of beginning is language—a medium in 
which the intellectual is both subject to determination and in which, or on which, 
he can seek to impose his own will. That willed act of linguistic intervention 
is always interested. To that extent, though it may be rationally undertaken, it 
also skirts the boundaries of reason. Hence the quotation from Bachelard, which 
suggests that reason is always most itself just at the point of its greatest danger.
Said is aligning himself with the “great modern rethinkers”: Marx, Lukács, 
Nietzsche, Vico (1985, 41). It is at this point that we encounter the second way 
Said appropriates Lukács, and this time it is the Marxist Lukács of History and 
Class Consciousness. Famously, in this book Lukács extended Marx’s ideas about 
the commodity fetish from the early chapters of Capital and combined them with 
ideas drawn from Max Weber on rationalization. Under conditions of monopoly 
capitalism, commodification has become a totalizing condition: all objects, 
all products, even people and their ideas and feelings become objectified and 
ossified and also rationally and positivistically quantifiable and standardized, 
reduced to the logic of the cash nexus and the balance sheet. Along with this goes 
the reification of consciousness: social atomization and individual alienation, 
where human beings lose a sense of an organic or coherent community or 
fellowship and the world appears as fragmentary and incoherent. Reification 
results in the inability of human beings to see or understand the historicity and 
totality of social relations, and therefore their passivity in the face of what seems 
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like an unchangeable and inexplicable world. Capitalism isolates commodity 
and consciousness, subject and object, from each other, so that their mutual 
interrelationship in the overall ensemble of human relations is hidden. However, 
if this interrelationship can be brought out into the open once again, then the 
exploitation and alienation of capitalism is revealed and can be contested. For 
Lukács, this exposure can be brought about by the revolutionary consciousness 
of the working classes, which can produce knowledge of the capitalist system 
as a totality. Said declared himself on numerous occasions to be opposed to 
totalizing modes of thought, be they conservative, Marxist, or Foucauldian. It 
is noteworthy that in his account of Lukács in Beginnings the emphasis is chiefly 
on reification, and on consciousness becoming self-consciousness and thereby 
critical consciousness. The term “totality” barely appears. But the fact is that 
the beginning manoeuvre of totalization was crucial for him, and it appears 
repeatedly in his major texts. His appropriation of Lukács in Beginnings is 
predicated on a vision of totality, even if it is provisional, always to be remade. 
Beginnings is, of course, about “beginnings”: in Said’s later work we see the critical 
self-conceptualization that is worked out in this book most overtly deployed and 
put into action.
The idea of totality was not original to Lukács: it can be traced back to 
Spinoza, and to Vico—an important thinker for Marx, for Lukács himself, and 
a crucial thinker for Gramsci and Said. But in the first half of the twentieth 
century, totality became an important theme for many of the major figures of the 
Western Marxist tradition, even for those such as Theodor Adorno who were 
deeply skeptical about the concept. A crucial part of my argument here is that 
totality remained a theme and concern running right through Said’s work and 
career, notwithstanding his qualifications and caution. It is important therefore 
to look in detail at Lukacs’s development of the concept.
The invocation of totality was part of Lukács’s wider renewal of Marxist 
dialectics, which in the 1920s set itself against the grim positivism which 
characterized much European thought, on the left as much as on the right. 
Believing that the rejuvenation of practice presupposed the renewal of theory, 
Lukács issued a radically Hegelian critique of Engels’s Anti-Duhring, accusing 
the Marxist orthodoxy of the day of a narrow economism and of scanting the 
roles of human consciousness and decision, distorting Marx’s original insights 
into the unity of theory and practice. In the manner of Lenin and Luxemburg, 
Lukács suggested that any revolution necessitated a theory of revolution—the 
aim of dialectical materialism being to make theory into a vehicle of revolution. 
Putting matters bluntly, Lukács was arguing that insofar as Marxist orthodoxy 
fetishized facticity and failed to understand facts as historical, it was as much a 
block to revolutionary change as bourgeois thought. For Lukács, of course, the 
“facts” of a given situation, a historical conjuncture, a cultural tradition, cannot 
simply be understood as themselves: they must be understood in terms of the 
totality. This comes within the context of the wider argument that it is not “the 
primacy of economic motives in historical explanation that constitutes the 
decisive difference between Marxism and bourgeois thought, but the point of 
view of totality”:
The fetishistic character of economic forms, the reification of all human relations, 
the constant expansion and extension of the division of labour which subjects 
the process of production to an abstract, rational analysis, without regard to the 
human potentialities and abilities of the immediate producers, all these things 
transform the phenomena of society and with them the way in which they are 
perceived. (Lukács 1971a, 27)
It is from this reification and division of labor that the positivist conception of 
the “fact”—an isolated, contextless atom—has arisen, but “dialectics insists on 
the concrete unity of the whole” (Lukács 1971a, 6).
Lukács’s radical manoeuvre with the concept of totality was the linkage 
with the class consciousness of the proletariat. Following Marx’s early insight 
in the Critique of Hegel’s Philosophy of Right that “when the proletariat proclaims 
the dissolution of the existing world order, it is only declaring the secret of its own 
existence” (Marx 1975, 256, emphasis in original), Lukács argues in History and Class 
Consciousness that the “totality of the object can be posited only when the positing 
subject is itself a totality.” Further, “if the subject wishes to understand itself, then 
it must conceive of the object as a totality” (Lukács 1971a, 28). Accordingly, the 
individual can never be the main measure for a properly dialectical philosophy or 
for revolutionary theory: 
For when the individual confronts objective reality he is faced by a complex of 
ready-made and unalterable objects which allow him only the subjective responses 
of recognition or rejection. Only the class can relate to the whole of reality in a 
practical revolutionary way. (Lukács 1971a, 193)
For Lukács, of course, the revolutionary class is the proletariat. Only the 
proletariat is capable of achieving the standpoint of totality. In achieving this 
position, the proletariat is able to break free of or to pierce the reified objectivity 
that is the “reality” recognized by bourgeois thought. But this revolutionary 
epistemology had also to be instantiated in a morally appropriate political form. 
Lukács characterizes the revolutionary class subject in the terms of an “imputed” 
consciousness, as contrasted to the “psychological” consciousness of the actually 
existing working class (51). Furthermore, class consciousness is the ethics of 
the proletariat, and any party that represents it must live up to its role as “the 
incarnation of the ethics of the fighting proletariat” (42).
The proletariat has this theoretical and practical potential because of its 
location in the processes of capitalist society. If reification brings with it the 
commodification and objectification of the entire life-world, it must be said 
that it has different effects and ramifications for the proletariat than for the 
bourgeoisie. For the proletariat to attain self-knowledge it must escape the mire 
of immediacy in which the bourgeoisie is entrapped. The true knowledge of 
its historical situation will always be hidden behind the immediate but reified 
empirical facts, which describe “reality” for the bourgeoisie. But the thought 
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of the proletariat does not require some clean slate of knowledge: since the 
proletariat aims for the complete transformation of society, it takes bourgeois 
society—its culture and ideas—as the “point of departure” (Lukács 1971a, 163) or 
the “beginning” point for its project (Said 1985, 1). In contrast to the bourgeoisie, 
embedded in its positivist vision of reality, the proletariat constantly must pierce 
this barrier:
The proletariat is confronted by the need to break through this barrier, to 
overcome it inwardly from the very start by adopting its own point of view. And as it 
is the nature of the dialectical method constantly to produce and to reproduce its 
own essential aspects, as its very being constitutes the denial of any smooth, linear 
development of ideas, the proletariat finds itself repeatedly confronted with the 
problem of its own point of departure both in its efforts to increase its theoretical 
grasp of reality and to initiate practical historical measures. (Lukács 1971a, 164).
According to Lukács, the bourgeoisie perceives reality in a dual manner or in 
“antinomian” terms. The split between perceiving subject and perceived object 
is always present—the individual always sees herself set over and against an 
overwhelming objective reality of which she can comprehend only fragments. 
Yet in fact it is “the conscious activity of the individual” that is to be found “on 
the object-side of the process,” whereas the subject cannot be awoken to his class 
consciousness, which remains obscure to him (1971a, 165). But the proletariat has 
a different view—for it, social reality does not appear in this divided form:
It appears in the first instance as the pure object of societal events. In every 
aspect of daily life in which the individual worker imagines himself to be the 
subject of his own life he finds this to be an illusion that is destroyed by the 
immediacy of his existence. This forces upon him the knowledge that the most 
elementary gratification of his needs, “his own individual consumption, whether 
it proceed within the workshop or outside it, whether it be part of the process of 
reproduction or not, forms therefore an aspect of the production and reproduction 
of capital.” . . . The quantification of objects, their subordination to abstract 
mental categories makes its appearance in the life of the worker immediately as a 
process of abstraction of which he is the victim, and which cuts him off from his 
labor-power, forcing him to sell it on the market as a commodity, belonging to 
him. And by selling this, his only commodity, he integrates it (and himself: for his 
commodity is inseparable from his physical existence) into a specialized process 
that has been rationalized and mechanized, a process that he discovers already 
existing, complete and able to function without him, and in which he is no more 
than a cipher reduced to an abstract quantity, a mechanized and rationalized tool. 
(Lukács 1971a, 165-66; emphasis in original)
The bourgeois has a sense of this reified world, but he still sees himself as an 
agent in the wider socio-political process. But the worker has no such sense of 
agency, yet this very fact “forces him to surpass the immediacy of his situation.” 
What are, for the bourgeois, the quantitative differences of exploitation that he 
sees as the quantitative determinants of the objects of his perception are felt by 
the proletarian rather as the “decisive qualitative categories of his whole physical, 
mental and moral existence” (1971a, 166; emphasis added). It is precisely because 
the worker experiences himself as objectified or reified, as an object, that he is 
enabled “to surpass the immediacy of his situation” (166). On the one hand, the 
worker is forced to understand himself as an object in the process of production, 
but on the other, “because of the split between subjectivity and objectivity 
induced in man by the compulsion to objectify himself as a commodity, the 
situation becomes one that can be made conscious” (168).
For Lukács, then, it is because the worker is objectified in the reified world of 
monopoly capital that he has the potential to attain a special kind of knowledge 
of that socio-economic system, or indeed to produce a new kind of knowledge of 
that system: “the worker can only become conscious of his existence in society 
when he becomes aware of himself as a commodity” (1971a, 168). The proletarian’s 
consciousness, that is, becomes the self-consciousness of the commodity, or 
the self-knowledge of the social system based on commodity exchange. This 
formulation is dramatic enough, but Lukács pushes it further: he argues that 
the worker’s self-knowledge brings about an objective structural change in the object 
of knowledge. In the worker’s self-knowledge, the “use-value” of labor becomes 
social reality.
Ultimately, ramifying out from this opening up of the commodity fetish in 
proletarian self-knowledge are, no matter how complexly mediated, the idea 
and the epistemology of totality. So, for Lukács, “the essence of the dialectical 
method lies in the fact that in every aspect correctly grasped by the dialectic the 
whole totality is comprehended and that the whole method can be unraveled 
from every single aspect” (1971a, 170). Not merely this, but the same broad 
process of the universalization of commodity exchange and reification also 
creates the proletariat as a class: it results, Lukács argues, in the abolition of the 
isolated individual (171). But the unique element of the situation of the proletariat 
is not only that it represents and dramatizes the dissolution of the bourgeois 
idea of individuality, but that its aspiration to transcend its immediacy, the given 
elements of its environment, always contains the aspiration toward society in 
its totality. For Lukács, this means “the transformation of the objective nature of the 
objects of action” (175; emphasis in original). By this he wishes to suggest that the 
objects of reality are now understood as fluid, in (historical) process, and in the 
context of praxis and action directed at the transformation of the whole. The 
historical process, Lukács tells us, is the source for this dialectical and totalizing 
understanding, and the proletariat is its embodiment:
Since its consciousness appears as the immanent product of the historical dialectic, 
it likewise appears to be dialectical. That is to say, this consciousness is nothing 
but the expression of historical necessity. . . . When its consciousness is put into 
practice it can only breathe life into the things which the dialectics of history have 
forced to a crisis; it can never “in practice” ignore the course of history, forcing on 
it what are no more than its own desires or knowledge. For it is itself nothing but 
the contradictions of history that have become conscious. (Lukács 1971a, 177–78)
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So the consciousness of the proletariat is not merely the source of a properly 
totalizing understanding of society, but is the “consciousness” of historical process 
in the Hegelian terms crucial to Lukács. Via his conception of the consciousness 
of the proletariat, Lukács has bridged the gap between the micro-detail of the 
commodity and the overall pattern of historical change of society. In becoming 
aware of the commodity relationship, the proletariat only becomes conscious of 
itself as the object of the production process. But if the reification of reality is 
dissolved into an understanding of flux and change, if the working of capital 
can be broken into “an unchanging process of its production and reproduction,” 
then “it is possible for the proletariat to discover that it is itself the subject of this 
process even though it is in chains and is for the time being unconscious of the 
fact” (181).
Lukács now draws on Hegel once more to reframe his argument. In 
understanding social development, Becoming is the meaning of Being, and 
process is all. And so “the developing tendencies of history constitute a higher 
reality than the empirical ‘facts’” (1971a, 181). History is no longer a mysterious 
flow to which human beings are subjected, or to be explained by transcendental 
forces. History is the work of human beings, but it is also and at the same time the 
succession of the processes by which the forms of human work are overthrown. 
Hence the famous Lukácsian formulation: “history is the history of the unceasing 
overthrow of the objective forms that shape the life of man” (186; emphasis in original).
Lukács goes on to conclude:
Reification is, then, the necessary, immediate reality of every person living in 
capitalist society. It can be overcome only by constant and constantly renewed efforts 
to disrupt the reified structure of existence by concretely relating to the concretely manifested 
contradictions of the total development, by becoming conscious of the immanent meanings of 
these contradictions for the total development. (Lukács 1971a, 197; emphasis in original)
The proletariat must attain a particular level of consciousness for this overcoming 
to begin. It must point toward the path of the dialectics of history. Only when 
this happens, only when proletarian consciousness becomes consciousness of this 
process, can the proletariat, in Lukács’s words, “become the identical subject-
object of history whose praxis will change reality” (197). The fullness of totality 
does not need to be explicit in the actions of the workers; what is necessary is that 
there should be “an aspiration towards totality.” So when considering whether 
a given action is right or wrong, what matters is how it relates to its function 
in “the total process” (198). Lastly, it must be realized that the consciousness of 
the proletariat is eminently practical (199). It is this characteristic that makes it 
transformative. Merely contemplative thought—as in the bourgeois tradition—
will be swamped once again by its immediacy. Proletarian thought must maintain 
its dialectical self-consciousness and capacity for self-criticism, which orientates 
it toward totality as process and the activity of the workers as a class. Only in this 
way will it develop, dialectically, from being a theory of praxis into a practical theory 
that will overturn the world (205).
This is the theory that underpins Said’s appropriation of Lukács and 
his vision of Lukács as a thinker of “beginnings.” What Lukács in particular 
offers Said, and therefore offers criticism, is a model of how thought can escape 
the reified and reifying conditions of ordinary, “immediate” social values and 
intellectual discourse and how it can attain a new knowledge of those conditions 
with a view to their destruction. Deep within the economic and philosophical 
logics of modernity, Lukács posits an immanent route to their overcoming within 
the terms of reified consciousness, rather than depending on an “outside” or an 
external “key.” Consciousness can therefore escape the capture of reification 
at certain crucial moments. At a moment of crisis in the social system that is 
characterized by reification, the values or ideas that lie outside of the capture 
of the economic laws of capitalism—sentiment, passion—become themselves 
vital to reified thought. Suddenly the reified mind has the opportunity to see 
behind the apparently ineluctable portrait of society as a mere array of economic 
factors and inert objects. The mind can then think not merely of the lifeless 
reified world, but of the process by which it came to be that way. The reified mind 
can understand its own objectified nature, but by so doing, it can then think 
past it, into a possible future. The crisis has become a moment of opportunity, 
of dialectical analytical thought, or, as Said sees it, of criticism. “Criticism” here, 
of course, means several things: it means that totalizing analytical angle which 
is able to dissolve the apparently rigidly fixed “facts” of a given historical and 
cultural situation and redispose them in terms of the totality—as dialectically 
and historically fluid, dynamic, and interrelated. For Lukács, this vision is 
the prerogative of the proletariat, but for Said it is also available to the critic, 
positioned “between culture and system” (1983, 178). If Lukács anticipates that the 
consciousness of the proletariat will be embodied and dramatized in a vanguard 
party, Said realizes that any such leadership of a new political or cultural vision 
must come via criticism.
In Beginnings, Said reads Marx through Lukács and in the company of Vico 
and Nietzsche. “The beginning,” he says, “is a way of grasping the whole project”:
As Georg Lukács surmised in History and Class Consciousness, it was Marx’s job to 
show first that the apparently immutable and object-like beginnings hitherto 
accepted by the norms of bourgeois thought contributed to, rather than lessened, 
the separation between man and his nature. (Said 1985, 41)
Marx goes on to show, “as Vico had shown before him,” that man is actually “the 
beginning” of all study—man for whom “the social reality of nature, and human 
natural science, or the natural science about man, are all equal terms.” As Said says, 
and here it’s worth quoting him at length:
Clearly, this signals a radical displacement of previous thought, for in order 
to see man as the true origin of social change a new fusion between man and 
his activity must be considered possible and thereby rethought in man’s mind. 
The very act of beginning must no longer set man apart from his end, but must 
immediately suggest significant connections between it and man. Marx thus tied 
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his interpretive activity to human activity in general at a common revolutionary 
point of departure. (Said 1985, 41)
In this passage, Said is rewriting Marx’s declaration in the Eleventh Thesis on 
Feuerbach: “Philosophers have hitherto only interpreted the world in various 
ways; the point is to change it” (Marx 1967, 402). Interviewed by the journal 
Diacritics a year after the publication of Beginnings, he spells out this project for 
criticism even more directly. Said is arguing that if we accept Lukács’s analyses of 
reification, alienation, and class consciousness, then we as critics must start with 
our own zone of activity. To accept the text’s economic and institutional modes 
of being under conditions of capitalism and bureaucratized, instrumentalized 
education is to acquiesce to the reification of text, criticism, and the critic:
Thus to interpret man’s work (as a laborer, literary critic, engineer, or whatever) as 
radically and organically connected with what man is and a whole entity (despite 
the fact that his consciousness cannot recognize or accept the connection) is 
the common and revolutionary point of departure both for the interpreter as 
interpreter and, as Lukács tried also to show, the proletariat as reinterpreter and 
upsetter of bourgeois reification. (Said 2001, 17)
Lukács is a writer to whom Said returned repeatedly. That return was made 
in a more pessimistic mood as Said got older, until it began to be radically revised 
in the last decade of Said’s life. But the felt need for the founding Lukácsian 
gesture of seeking to reattach critical work to a “whole entity” and to overcome a 
condition of reified objectification would be experienced repeatedly throughout 
Said’s work. The explicit and dramatic linkage made here between “the 
interpreter as interpreter” and “the proletariat as reinterpreter and upsetter of 
bourgeois reification” was rarely made in quite such clearly class terms. But I 
would argue it must be seen as underpinning fundamental critical “beginnings” 
or ground-clearings Said repeatedly made in his later career. Many of the great 
Lukácsian themes are crucial for Said: the need to renew theory in order to renew 
practice; the idea (present also in his phenomenological heritage, as we saw above) 
of meaning as a potential for human praxis and consciousness residing in nature; 
and, though he is not fond of the terms, the dialectical insistence on the whole—
“The beginning as a way of grasping the whole project”—and on the presence 
of history and human consciousness suffusing the facts of a given situation—“so 
much the worse for the facts,” as Lukács sarcastically dismissed merely empiricist 
or positivist accounts of reality (1972, 27).
Within a couple of years of Beginnings, the founding, beginning gesture 
is repeated and reinflected in Orientalism, but now via the ideas of Antonio 
Gramsci. If Lukács and Gramsci were roughly contemporaneous intellectual-
revolutionaries, then we must recognize that their thought on totality overlapped 
in some regards and differed sharply in others. It seems reasonable, with Stuart 
Sim, to see a broad similarity between Lukácsian reification and Gramscian 
hegemony (Sim 1994, 2). Both of these phenomena constitute the intellectual 
infrastructure that must be escaped and then overthrown by the radical critic 
and the movements to which she is attached. Where Lukács and Gramsci differ is 
in regard to the mode of escape and overthrow. Two important areas where they 
differ are in regard to the avant-garde status of the working class and the position 
of the critic-intellectual.
Gramsci did not use the vocabulary of “totality,” but his work still employs 
such ideas, which he developed by way of his relationship with Hegel and Croce 
as much as through his Marxism. Martin Jay points out how important the 
idea of the “organic” was for Gramsci and how it forged his totalizing holism. 
Gramsci’s idea of hegemony (which he actually attributes to Lenin)—an ideological 
leadership, thought and made and disseminated by organic intellectuals—is in 
many ways a version of the idea of totality. But it is certainly a looser concept than 
Lukács’s totality, and it is therefore more dynamic. Gramsci famously advocated 
what he called a “philosophy of praxis,” which was predicated on an “absolute 
historicism” (Gramsci 1971, 465). Jay reminds us that Gramsci’s idealist heritage 
helps account for his concept of history as a “longitudinal totality,” “a coherent 
whole with an implicit telos” (Jay 1984, 156). In 1918, stressing the importance of 
culture in an article in the paper Il Grido del Popolo, Gramsci is very clear in his 
totalizing vision:
Persuaded that all human historical activity is one, that thought is one, I see 
in the resolution of any cultural problem the potential resolution of all others, 
and I believe that it is useful to accustom the intellect to grasping this unity in 
the manifold aspects of life, to accustom it to the organic search for truth and 
understanding, and to apply the fundamental principles of a doctrine to all 
contingencies. (Quoted in Cavalcanti and Piccone 1975, 29) 
He links this view of history to the agency of the workers in an article from 1916:
If it is true that universal history is a chain of efforts by man to free himself from 
privileges, prejudices and idolatries, then it is not clear why the proletariat, which 
wants to add another link to this chain, should not know how, why and by whom it 
has been preceded, and what benefit it may derive from this knowledge. (Quoted 
in Cavalcanti and Piccone 1975, 23)
Subsequently, in the Prison Notebooks, the view of history as totality is reiterated:
Every real historical phase leaves traces of itself in succeeding phases, which then 
become in a sense the best document of its existence. The process of historical 
development is a unity in time through which the present contains the whole of 
the past and in the present is realized that part of the past which is “essential”—
with no residue of any “unknowable” representing the true “essence.” (Gramsci 
1971, 409)
Yet it must also be noted that unlike Lukács, Gramsci did not accept the idea 
of the proletariat as a historical metasubject, as the engine of history, and his 
conception of hegemony-as-totality is looser than Lukács’s model. Hegemony is 
precisely a network of ideas and values arrived at by a group under the guidance 
of organic intellectuals, not ideological domination delivered from on high. 
Jay suggests that this conception in Gramsci is derived from Vico’s idea of a 
“sensus communis” (Jay 1984, 160), which, conjoined with Gramsci’s historicist 
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understanding of language, helps produce an idea of hegemony as intersubjectively 
constructed meaning, more important (because more effective) than truth as an 
a priori postulate:
Rationality and objectivity for Gramsci are to be constructed in a process of 
cultural unification, a kind of collective Bildung. Instead of a metasubject at 
the beginning of the process, who creates the totality expressively, there is an 
intersubjective totalization which is to be completed in the future. (Jay 1984, 159)
Gramsci is famous for his typology of intellectuals, most particularly organic 
and traditional intellectuals. Jay reminds us that few thinkers in the Western 
Marxist tradition highlighted the role of intellectuals in the social whole as much 
as Gramsci; indeed, “none acknowledged their links with the concept of totality 
as candidly as he did” (1984, 166). It may well have been this element in Gramsci’s 
thinking that most attracted Said—the tasking of intellectuals, as against the 
proletariat, as the “identical subject-object of history,” with totalizing hegemonic 
thinking (Lukács 1971a, 197). Of course, Gramsci envisaged that the working class 
would eventually throw up its own “organic” intellectuals, though it must be said 
that most radical intellectuals attuned or affiliated to the needs and experiences 
of the oppressed have come from outside of the oppressed class, Edward Said 
himself being a good example. But this is precisely the problem for Gramsci: is the 
totalization or hegemony elaborated by intellectuals created “outside” or “within” 
the proletariat? Is he allying himself with other Marxist revolutionaries such as 
Lenin, Kautsky, and Luxemburg in suggesting that proletarian consciousness 
must be delivered to the workers? Or is he assuming, naively, that the workers 
will autonomously generate their own theory? He gets around this problem by 
suggesting, famously, that “all men are intellectuals . . . but not all men have 
in society the function of intellectuals” (Gramsci 1971, 9). Added to this is the 
imperative for intellectuals not simply to lead or direct social blocs, but to merge 
with the oppressed in the form of an “intellectual-moral bloc”—it is out of such a 
bloc that a new hegemony can be forged, and society changed (332–33).
In Orientalism, then, we find a reinflection of some of the Lukácsian motifs, 
but now filtered through Gramsci. In the introduction, Said gives a description 
of Arab life in America that he then reframes as both the context and the 
opportunity for critical intellectual formation. He starts by reminding us that 
to live as a Palestinian Arab in the United States has been “disheartening.” Said 
writes that “there exists here an almost unanimous consensus that politically he 
[the Palestinian] does not exist, and when it is allowed that he does, it is either as 
a nuisance or as an Oriental” (Said 1979, 27). He continues:
The web of racism, cultural stereotypes, political imperialism, dehumanizing 
ideology holding in the Muslim or the Arab is very strong indeed, and it is this 
web which every Palestinian has come to feel is his uniquely punishing destiny. 
(Said 1979, 27)
Again, we remember the force of the June 1967 war as an impulse for Said’s 
formation. With Orientalism, this shattering history finally produced the critical 
intellectual we recognize today:
In the Prison Notebooks, Gramsci says “The starting point of critical elaboration is 
the consciousness of what one really is, and ‘knowing thyself’ as a product of the 
historical process to date, which has deposited in you an infinity of traces, without 
leaving an inventory.” . . . Gramsci’s Italian text concludes by adding, “therefore 
it is imperative at the outset to compile such an inventory.” (Said 1979, 25; quoting 
Gramsci 1971, 324)
There are a couple of points to make here. First, what is striking in looking 
at these formulations consecutively is that in them, the “historical process” is 
equated with, coterminous with, isomorphic with, the “web” of domination 
that is the Palestinian’s “uniquely punishing destiny.” Within this frame, the 
Palestinian Arab does not really exist: certainly not as a political subject, at best 
as a form of inert impediment or irritant. Burdened with racism, stereotype, 
dehumanization, the Palestinian has been objectified, marginalized, rendered 
passive and amenable to instrumentalist manipulation—in a word, reified. 
Second, the suggestion, worked out through Gramsci, is that for the Palestinian 
to come to self-consciousness as “an infinity of traces” deposited by persons and 
forces outside of herself is for her to attain the “starting point”—the beginning—
of critical elaboration. Behind these arguments lies the Lukácsian idea that to 
absorb, come to self-consciousness about, and then make an inventory of that 
“infinity of traces” is the first step toward a radically totalizing insurrectionary 
critical procedure. To recognize oneself as the hitherto passive object of this 
hostile “historical process” is the first step in what Raymond Williams called the 
“unlearning” of the “inherent dominative mode,” the becoming the subject of one’s 
own history (Williams 1993, 336). The simple point here, rarely acknowledged by 
Said’s readers, is the suggestion that the overwhelming “discourse” of Orientalism 
Said narrated is the “infinity of traces” deposited in Said, and in other “Orientals” 
in the West, by Western intellectual culture. This renders Orientalism not 
merely a devastating account of the discursive coherence and force of Western 
representations of the Orient, but also and at the same time a terrifying narrative 
of the overmastering Western tradition to which an Oriental is subjected—in 
which Edward Said is an object.
We must also note here that, with Gramsci, Said offers a picture of the 
historical process constructing and defining a Palestinian “Oriental,” now turned 
ninety degrees on its axis and conceived of as a kind of spatialized history. He has, 
at this point, already discussed the distinction between what he calls “pure and 
political knowledge” (Said 1979, 9). He bases this distinction in two discursive 
frameworks: that of area studies, of which the most important analytical unit 
is the nation-state; and that of Gramsci’s differentiation of political and civil 
society. These are, of course, spatial frameworks. We therefore should not be 
surprised to find him describing Orientalism in such terms. It is
Conor McCarthy |  ESSAYS    8 9
90    COLLEGE LITERATURE  |  40.4 Fall 2013
a distribution of geopolitical awareness into aesthetic, scholarly, economic, 
sociological, historical, and philological texts; it is an elaboration not only of a 
basic geographical distinction (the world is made up of two unequal halves, Orient 
and Occident) but also of a whole series of interests which, by such means as 
scholarly discovery, philological reconstruction, psychological analysis, landscape 
and sociological description, it not only creates but also maintains; it is, rather 
than expresses, a certain will or intention to understand, in some case to control, 
manipulate, even to incorporate, what is a manifestly different . . . world. (Said 
1979, 12; emphasis in original)
Thus, Orientalism is as much a matter of geography as it is of history. But this 
spatializing of history is itself suggested to Said by Gramsci. Much later in his 
career, Said wrote explicitly on Gramsci’s spatial or geographical terminologies, 
which he suggested offered an alternative to the remorselessly Hegelian temporal 
logics of Lukács’s thought (Said 2000, 453–73). It might reasonably be argued that 
Said overplays this idea, given Gramsci’s enormous debt to Croce, one of the great 
Hegelian thinkers of the twentieth century. But certainly Gramsci’s vocabulary 
and analytics have a distinctly spatial bent: he uses and places a great premium 
on the idea of “world” or one’s “conception of the world,” and his accounts of 
historical development are frequently imbued with the language of territory, war, 
manoeuvre, conquest (Jessop 2008, 101–17). Even more vivid, and never discussed 
by Said’s literary interpreters, is Gramsci’s anticipation of the basic premise of 
Orientalism, fifty years before Said: 
In order to understand exactly the possible significance of the problem of the 
reality of the external world, it may be useful to develop the example of the notions 
of “East” and “West” which do not stop being “objectively real” even if on analysis 
they prove to be nothing but conventions, i.e. “historico-cultural constructions.” 
. . . It is evident that East and West are arbitrary, conventional, i.e. historical, 
constructions, because outside real history any point on the earth is East and West 
at the same time. We can see this point more clearly from the fact that these 
terms have been crystallized not from the point of view of man in general but 
from the point of view of the cultured European classes who, through their world 
hegemony, have made the terms evolved by themselves accepted everywhere. 
(Quoted in Wainwright 2005, 1037)
Here we have enacted, briefly and effectively, precisely the procedure that was so 
important for Said: the identification of geographical signifiers as conventional 
but also as “historico-cultural,” and the identification of their hegemonic 
deployment. We can now see more clearly than ever before how Orientalism can 
be understood as a historical geography of European descriptive and analytical 
rhetorics of the Near East, as much as an account of a Foucauldian “discourse.” 
This vision of the book is best appreciated through the linkage it deploys of 
Lukácsian and Gramscian historical and spatial critiques.
Consequently, we must then realize that Said in fact views all culture, and 
therefore criticism, in such terms. In “Secular Criticism,” the lead essay of The 
World, the Text, and the Critic, Said explicitly suggests that there is a relationship 
between culture, especially a majority culture or “high” culture, and the state. 
Said notably understands culture as a hegemonic system and as being in a strong 
sense spatial. He takes this from no less conservative a figure than Matthew 
Arnold. He notes “the power of culture by virtue of its elevated or superior 
position to authorize, to dominate, to legitimate, demote, interdict, and validate: 
in short, the power of culture to be an agent of, and perhaps the main agency for, 
powerful differentiation within its domain and beyond it too.” Further, culture 
is for Said “a system of values saturating downward almost everything within its 
purview” (1983, 9). Via Arnold, he identifies a dominant culture with the state, 
“insofar as culture is man’s best self, and the State its realization in material 
reality” (10). Thus the power of culture is effectively the power of the state. This 
interdependence of culture and the state means that “to be for and in culture is 
to be in and for a State in a compellingly loyal way.” Said then offers a formulation 
that links culture, the state, and geography in significant ways:
With this assimilation of culture to the authority and exterior framework of the 
State go as well such things as assurance, confidence, the majority sense, the entire 
matrix of meanings we associate with “home,” belonging and community. Outside 
this range of meanings—for it is the outside that partially defines the inside in this 
case—stand anarchy, the culturally disenfranchised, those elements opposed to 
culture and State: the homeless, in short. (Said 1983, 11)
Said is describing culture here as a spatialized system, which defines itself partly 
by means of that which it rejects and extrudes, and suggesting that the borders of 
culture are related to the borders of the state.
Over and against this image of culture as a geopolitical system of authority and 
hegemony, Said pitches criticism, or “critical consciousness” (1983, 24). Criticism, 
he tells us, “is always situated” (26) or “oppositional” (29). Again, the metaphors 
are geographical: criticism is a mobile, vulnerable, committed, anti-dynastic, non-
systematic guerrilla operation, attendant equally to that which is occluded by 
texts but necessary to their functioning, and to that web or network of affiliations 
which permits texts their existence and durability as texts. Using this Gramscian 
vocabulary, Said produces an idea of texts not merely as historical objects, but as 
elements of a historical geography of culture, and of criticism as the necessarily roving 
consciousness best equipped to survey that terrain. We can confirm this if we look 
at an oddly neglected essay of Said’s, “Opponents, Audiences, Constituencies, 
and Community.” There Said sets up a model of “secular criticism” based on ideas 
not only from Gramsci, but also from Vico. Criticism takes place in what Said 
calls Vico’s “gentile realm”—a “web of filiations and affiliations that composes 
human history,” humanly made (2000, 130). Taking Vico’s conception of secular 
history (from which divine origins have been excluded), Said derives the idea 
that history and “everything in it, presents its interpreter with a vast horizontal 
expanse, across which are to be seen many interrelated structures” (131). Once 
again, spatial metaphors emerge: the spatialization of history in fact, but cast in 
terms taken from Vico and Gramsci, not Foucault as some might expect.
At this point, we need to put together two homeless or unhoused elements 
in Said’s thought: the “culturally disenfranchised” (1983, 11), but also, of course, 
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criticism itself: a discourse, for Said, of “transcendental homelessness.” Culture, 
in the sense understood in Said’s Gramscian reading of Arnold, is a hierarchical 
system of
exclusions legislated from above but enacted throughout . . . [the State’s] polity, 
by which such things as anarchy, disorder, irrationality, inferiority, bad taste and 
immorality are identified, then deposited outside the culture and kept there by the 
power of the State and its institutions. (Said 1983, 11)
The broad point here is that Said sees criticism sharing the same space as the 
disenfranchised. But we might also note that the disenfranchised are in a similar 
cultural space to the “Oriental”: defined, demoted, and marginalized.
Let us now return to the Lukács of History and Class Consciousness, with its 
analysis of reification, and its argument that reification can be overcome by the 
theory of totality in proletarian consciousness. I wish to suggest that in Said’s 
description of the Palestinian exile in America, in the description of those shunted 
outside the honorific spaces of Arnoldian state-centered “culture,” we see a version 
of Lukácsian reified subjects; and in the writing of Orientalism, we see a version of 
the Lukácsian theoretical totalizing rearticulation of subject and object. In spite 
of the borrowing from Foucault evident in Orientalism, and indeed also in Said’s 
description of culture, it seems to me that he is also drawing on Lukács’s image of 
isolated, demeaned, passive, and alienated subjects under conditions of monopoly 
capitalism. It equally appears that not only the discussion of “beginnings” in 
the book of that title but also the suggestion that Orientalism can be read as 
(among other things) the coming-to-historical-geographical-consciousness of a 
Palestinian intellectual, alienated both historically and geographically, is a version 
of Lukács’s class consciousness. If we go back to History and Class Consciousness, we 
remember that it is precisely because the proletariat is the most downtrodden and 
reified social fraction that its coming to self-consciousness is so powerful, and 
has the potential “unceasingly to overthrow the objective forms that shape the 
life of man.” In Said’s extraordinary narrative of Orientalism, we see an example 
of “thought thinking its way through fragmentation to unity” (1983, 233). Here is 
Said describing consciousness attaining self-consciousness:
Consciousness attaining self-consciousness is no Emma Bovary pretending to be 
a lady in Yonville. The direct pressures of capitalist quantification, that relentless 
cataloging of everything on earth, continue to be felt, according to Lukács; the 
only thing that changes is that the mind recognizes a class of beings like itself who 
have the power to think generally, to take in facts but to organize them in groups, 
to recognize processes and tendencies where reification only allows evidence of 
lifeless atoms. Class consciousness therefore begins in critical consciousness. 
Classes are not real the way that trees and houses are real; they are imputable by 
consciousness, using its powers to posit ideal types in which with other beings it 
finds itself. Classes are the result of an insurrectionary act by which consciousness 
refuses to be confined to the world of objects. (Said 1983, 233)
It is not unreasonable to suggest that Orientalism has gone further than any work 
of Western literary criticism in the last fifty years as an “insurrectionary act.”
I must register therefore some agreement with Aijaz Ahmad when he suggests 
that, among other things, Orientalism can be read as a shadow or “secret sharer” 
text of Erich Auerbach’s Mimesis (Ahmad 1992, 163). Said sees in this magisterial 
account of Western realist literary representation both a model and a foil. Lukács 
suggests to him that critique emerges in close proximity to that which oppresses 
or blocks it. Gramsci suggests to him that Auerbach’s work must be seen not 
only in historical but also in geographical terms, and this leads him to his famous 
(and arguably romanticized) narrative of the composition of Mimesis in Istanbul.1 
No matter that Auerbach represents a form of criticism and thought rather 
more conservative than that of Lukács; the movement into exile and out of his 
normal cultural home is what enables the thinking of a new mode of cultural and 
critical “totality.” Citing the book’s epilogue, Said notes that it might never have 
been written had Auerbach not been unshackled from the normal professional 
confines, limits, procedures, and codes of German philological scholarship by his 
geographical location in Turkey. If Bachelard regarded intellectual experiment 
that did not risk the thinker’s reason as no experiment at all, then Auerbach risks 
accusations of intellectual overreaching, superficiality, and mere amateurism 
in executing what he regards as an act of cultural survival. In the late essay 
“Philology and Weltliteratur,” Auerbach quotes the passage from the Didascalicon 
of Hugo of St. Victor, of which Said was so fond:
It is, therefore, a great source of virtue for the practiced mind to learn, bit by bit, 
first to change about in visible and transitory things, so that afterwards it may be 
able to leave them behind altogether. (Auerbach 1969, 17)
Noteworthy here is the stress on the intellectual working through experiences 
and ideas so as eventually to leave them behind; this process works in multiple 
directions. If Auerbach, the Jewish scholar of Christian European literature, 
produces an extraordinary affirmation of that literature from exile in Muslim 
Turkey, then Said, the Christian Palestinian Arab exiled in the United States, 
performs what he would later call the intellectual “voyage in,” in a brilliant 
implicit critique of Auerbach and the tradition he represents.2 “One must have 
tradition in oneself,” as Adorno put it in Minima Moralia, “to hate it properly” 
(1974, 52).
The World, the Text, and the Critic, composed of essays originally published 
between 1969 and 1982, is the single work by Said most concerned with criticism 
and theoretical politics. In keeping with the book’s overall status as a powerful and 
still relevant manifesto for a radicalized American criticism, it can be recast both 
overall and at the level of individual essays in our Lukácsian/Gramscian terms. 
It opens, as we have seen, with Said’s Gramscian-geographical reformulation of 
reification-and-totality in the narrative of Auerbach’s exile in Istanbul, and the 
way in which his geographical removal from Europe permitted his totalizing 
critical reappropriation of European culture in Mimesis. It then buttresses this 
reading in theoretical terms with its Gramscian reformulation of Arnold’s Culture 
and Anarchy. But much else in the book can be framed in this manner also. For 
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example, the “literary” writer given most attention in the collection is Swift, whose 
attraction for Said is precisely his seeming resistance to the reifying impulses 
of modern criticism and scholarship. Swift, to whom two essays (“Swift’s Tory 
Anarchy” and “Swift as Intellectual”) are devoted, was politically conservative, 
but he is for Said a “Tory anarchist” (the term George Orwell coined to describe 
Swift). For Said, Swift represents “critical consciousness in a raw form, a large-
scale model of the dilemmas facing the contemporary critical consciousness that 
has tended to be too cloistered and too attracted to easy systematizing” (1983, 28). 
To read Swift is to encounter a series of events “in all their messy force,” textual 
events that cannot easily be monumentalized or institutionalized and hence are 
resistant to the reifying tendencies of modern criticism and scholarship. Not 
merely this, but Swift’s political involvement, the occasional status of so much 
of his writing, is related to his tendency to inhabit that which he criticizes—
by absorbing his object he can then most effectively criticize it. Most famously 
(or notoriously) in A Modest Proposal, Swift produces a blistering critique of the 
reifying and life-denying rhetoric of political-economic rationality as applied to 
Ireland in the early 1700s, by arguing from within that rhetoric that the Irish, 
afflicted by economic collapse and famine, should raise and fatten their children 
to be eaten or sold on the market. Swift, in fact, emerges with the most positive 
image of critical consciousness that Said offers in the book:
In its energy and its unparalleled verbal wit, its restlessness, its agitational and 
unacademic designs on its political and social context, Swift’s writing supplies 
modern criticism with what it has sorely needed since Arnold covered critical 
writing with the mantle of cultural authority and reactionary political quietism. 
(Said 1983, 28)
When we come to the essays on critical theory, we realize that the reification 
of intellectual life, and specifically literary criticism, is Said’s principal theme. 
The essay “Reflections on American ‘Left’ Literary Criticism” deploys Gramsci to 
remind such American critics that their theoretical radicalism is always-already 
contained by the hegemonic apparatus of the state, and that real radicalism 
will necessitate explicitly thinking through that reifying and bureaucratizing 
dominative and discursive machinery. But on a wider canvas, an essay such as 
“Roads Taken and Not Taken in Contemporary Criticism”—a neglected but 
valuable piece—has as its primary theme the functionalism of most modern 
criticism. Said notes earlier in the book that in spite of (perhaps even because of) 
the arrival in the American academy of the most advanced and radical European 
cultural theory since the 1960s, criticism has become increasingly abstract 
and professionalized. He points out that the origins of theory in Europe were 
“insurrectionary” (1983, 3). Thinkers as various as Saussure, Lukács, Bataille, Levi-
Strauss, Freud, Nietzsche, and Marx were all critical of the traditional university, 
of “the hegemony of determinism and positivism, the reification of ideological 
‘bourgeois humanism,’ the rigid barriers between academic specialities.” Yet 
what has happened is that American criticism has “retreated into the labyrinth 
of ‘textuality’” (3). This textuality “has therefore become the exact antithesis and 
displacement of what might be called history” (4). By “functionalism,” Said means 
a concentration on “what a text does, how it works, how it has been put together 
in order to do certain things, how the text is a wholly integrated and equilibrated 
system” (144). Such an approach to texts may permit detailed analytical 
discussion, but it also risks scientism and technocracy, which for Said amounts 
to a reification of criticism. Functionalist criticism, in making for itself densely 
complex professional vocabularies, cuts itself off from a wider public of non-
expert readers. Worse again, it may operate in a self-justifying, even tautological 
manner: “You experience the text making the critic work, and the critic in turn 
shows the text at work: the product of these interchanges is simply that they 
have taken place. Critical ingenuity is pretty much confined to transposing the 
work into an instance of the method” (145). Furthermore, such criticism suggests 
that a text’s workings are chiefly internal, thus implying that the text exists in 
an autonomous idealized space of its own making: “The text becomes idealized, 
essentialized, instead of remaining as the special kind of cultural object it really 
is, with a causation, persistence, durability and social presence quite its own” 
(148). For Said, in contrast, the task of criticism is precisely to reread the text 
in totalizing terms, as part of the dialectical unfolding of the historical process.
It is appropriate, then, that The World, the Text, and the Critic should also 
include Said’s reflexive and pessimistic analysis of the fate of Lukács’s theory, 
which underpinned so much of his own work. This comes in the essay “Traveling 
Theory,” which offers the template for the reification and institutionalization 
of radical theory that is the wider narrative of the book. Here Said argues that 
as Lukács’s theory of reification-and-totality, which was originally produced in 
the openly revolutionary context of the Hungarian Socialist Republic in 1919, 
has moved to and been appropriated by more strictly academic contexts and 
thinkers—Lucien Goldmann at the Sorbonne in the 1950s, and Raymond Williams 
at Cambridge in the 1970s—it has itself become reified and institutionalized. It 
has changed, that is, from being the theoretical analogue and self-consciousness 
of the Hungarian revolution to being an analytical method: 
The sheer existence of class, or theoretical, consciousness for Lukcás is enough 
to suggest to him the projected overthrow of objective forms. For Goldmann an 
awareness of class or group consciousness is first of all a scholarly imperative, and 
then—in the works of highly privileged writers—the expression of a tragically 
limited social situation. (Said 1983, 235)
The question then is, legitimately, how does Said himself escape this logic of 
theoretical degeneration, institutionalization, emasculation? In Culture and 
Imperialism, we shall see how he reads Lukácsian ideas “travelling” to the colonial 
setting; but even before that, in his work on Palestine, Said himself performs 
precisely this move—reigniting critical ideas by redeploying them in new and 
fraught circumstances.
The kind of critical consciousness Said is advocating is given explicitly 
political, even insurrectionary, expression in his splendid essay “Zionism from 
the Standpoint of Its Victims,” the centerpiece of The Question of Palestine. 
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“Beginnings,” Said writes in Orientalism, “have to be made for each project in such 
a way as to enable what follows from them” (Said 1979, 16; emphasis in original). 
This essay is surely one of Said’s most important single interventions in the cause 
of Palestine. As was the case with Orientalism, it takes the form of a Gramscian 
inventory of traces deposited in the reified Palestinian subject by the processes 
of oppressive historical geography, which, once made, then enables fostering 
Palestinian consciousness both as the victim of Zionism and, therefore, as the 
agent and embodiment of its final overthrow.
Once again, we are presented with the sense that what is to be analyzed and 
critiqued exists on both historical and geographical axes: “Every idea or system 
of ideas exists somewhere, is mixed in with historical circumstances, is part of 
what one may very simply call ‘reality’” (Said 1992, 56). Part of the problem with 
Zionism, Said suggests as his opening gambit, is that it has mostly been treated 
as an idealist phenomenon, without determinate material or worldly effects. But 
to the Palestinian, “Zionism was somebody else’s idea imported into Palestine . . . 
for which in a very concrete way he or she was made to pay and suffer.” Said then 
suggests the investigation of a political idea such as Zionism in both geographical 
and historical ways:
Effective political ideas like Zionism need to be investigated historically in two 
ways: (1) genealogically in order that their provenance, their kinship and descent, 
their affiliation both with other ideas and with political institutions may be 
demonstrated; (2) as practical systems for accumulation (of power, land, ideological 
legitimacy) and of displacement (of people, other ideas, prior legitimacy). (Said 
1992, 57; emphasis in original)
Again, one notices the mixture of temporal and spatial, historical and 
geographical, metaphors at work in this passage. Ideas like Zionism can be traced 
by a radical Nietzschean genealogy, but they must also be seen as taking place or 
unfolding in a determinate space that is not merely discursive, and as aspiring 
to displace other comparable or rival systems of ideas. Of course, Zionism has 
been particularly successful because it has “hidden, or caused to disappear, the 
literal historical ground of its growth, its political cost to the native inhabitants 
of Palestine, and its militantly oppressive discriminations between Jews and non-
Jews” (57). Again, Zionism’s power is related to its geographical purchase.
To show the historical-geographical process by which Zionism has treated 
Palestine and Palestinians as reified objects, Said proceeds by way of an 
examination of the writings of Chaim Weizmann, the chief architect of the 
relationship between Britain and the Zionist movement and the first president 
of Israel. Said detects in this writing a will to visualize and then to implement a 
scheme for creating a network of realities—a language, a grid of colonies, a set of 
institutions—which would convert Palestine from its present state of “neglect” 
into a Jewish state (Said 1992, 86). This network would not so much attack the 
existing realities as ignore them, grow up beside them, and overshadow them, 
eventually choking them like so much ivy. Weizmann modified the wording of 
the Balfour Declaration, which had promised to “establish” a Jewish homeland 
in Palestine, by arguing for the “re-establishment” of a Jewish state there (86). 
Thus, the construction of the state would not be the supplanting or breaking up 
of an existing society, but a reclamation, a redemption, a repetition, a realization 
of Palestine and of Jewish hegemony over it. The ancient state is repeated and 
realized by the new one, and so the Zionist narrative construes Israel as a return 
to an earlier state of affairs, and, thereby, as legitimate (Said 1992, 85-87).
Said argues therefore that the respective denials of each other by the Jewish 
and Palestinian communities are not comparable. The Zionist denial, he says, is 
strikingly paradoxical:
Zionism aimed to create a society that could never be anything but “native” (with 
minimal ties to a metropolitan center) at the same time that it determined not 
to come to terms with the very natives it was replacing with new (but essentially 
European) “natives.” (Said 1992, 88)
The Palestinian denial, by contrast, is a much simpler thing, and this accounts to 
a degree for the weakness of the Palestinian position vis-à-vis Israel. According to 
Said, the Palestinians have failed to appreciate that Zionism is “a policy of detail, 
not simply a general colonial vision” (95). Palestine, to Zionism, was not simply 
the Promised Land, which is a highly abstract concept. It was also a territory that 
was to be known, surveyed, studied, planned for, and worked on down to the last 
square meter. “Another acre, another goat,” Weizmann once wrote (1983, 634). 
Palestinians opposed Jewish settlement in general; they described it as foreign 
colonization (which the early Zionists admitted it to be); they said it was unfair 
to the natives (which it was); but they had no detailed counterproposals or actions 
of their own of a proximate or comparable kind.
In a distinctly Lukácsian manner, Said seeks to show the means, the processes, 
by which Zionism has managed to reify both Palestine and Palestinians. He 
suggests that the Palestinians have failed to understand the extraordinary Zionist 
drive not merely to take over land but, in a real sense, to produce it. It is this 
historical-geographical carapace that must be pierced for a Palestinian national 
subject to break back into history. In his autobiography, Weizmann quotes 
from a document of 1917, an “Outline of Program for the Jewish Resettlement 
of Palestine in Accordance with the Aspirations of the Zionist Movement.” In 
this document, Said finds an extraordinary language used, a “vision of a matrix 
of organizations whose functioning duplicates that of an army.” He notes that 
the document speaks of “opening” the country to “suitable” Jews (Said 1992, 96). 
For Said, this recalls a Foucauldian disciplinary apparatus. It is an army, after all, 
that “opens” territory and prepares it for settlement; that supports immigration, 
shipping, and supply; and, most important of all, that converts mere citizens to 
“suitable” disciplined agents whose job it is to establish a presence on the land and 
to invest it with their structures, organizations, and institutions. For Said,
Just as an army assimilates ordinary citizens to its purposes—by dressing them in 
uniforms, by exercising them in tactics and maneuvers, by disciplining everyone to 
its purposes—so too did Zionism dress the Jewish colonists in the system of Jewish 
labor and Jewish land, whose uniform required that only Jews were acceptable. The 
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power of the Zionist army did not reside in its leader, nor in the arms it collected 
for its conquests and defense, but rather in the functioning of a whole system, 
a series of positions taken and held, as Weizmann says, in agriculture, culture, 
commerce, and industry. (Said 1992, 96–97)
But this process can also be seen as the production of what we would call, after 
Hegel, Marx, and Lukács, “second nature,” or what Neil Smith in his book 
Uneven Development calls “the differentiation of national space according to the 
territorial division of labor” (Smith 1984, 146). We need to note also the abstract 
implications of Said’s analysis here, for this leads us back to his other writings 
on criticism, worldliness, and the state. First, he is offering us here a powerful 
example of Zionism’s ability to effect what he called in Orientalism “a distribution 
of geopolitical awareness into aesthetic, scholarly, economic, sociological, 
historical, and philological texts.” Hence we can now understand Zionism in the 
way we understand the discourse of Orientalism: “It is, rather than expresses, a 
certain will or intention to understand, in some case to control, manipulate, even 
to incorporate, what is a manifestly different . . . world” (Said 1979, 12). Further, 
we can now go further and say, with Said and Gramsci, that what this amounts 
to is the marshaling of the civil society of the Yishuv into the elaboration of 
essentially military directive ideas. If Weizmann uses military metaphors to 
describe the colonial program of Zionism, then it is worth remembering that an 
army is part of the repressive apparatus of a state and also the ultimate defender 
of state sovereignty. Furthermore, its primary role is to control space—its task is 
the spatial projection of state power. But an army also functions as, in Althusser’s 
famous terms, an “ideological state apparatus”: it turns citizens into citizen-
soldiers; it inculcates in citizens values such as the paramount status of the state, 
its sovereignty, its territorial integrity, the legitimacy of its violence, the necessity 
of subsuming individuality in the corporate body that is the state (Althusser 1971, 
125–86). Zionism, in this analysis, with its extraordinary powers of “accumulation” 
and “displacement” (Said 1992, 57), is only a particularly dramatic illustration of 
Said’s radical reading of Arnoldian culture as a spatialized system of authority 
coterminous with the boundaries of the state, constructed out of that which it 
objectifies and extrudes—into geographically marginal space and outside of the 
historical process as conceived in an Enlightenment or Hegelian manner.
However, “Zionism from the Standpoint of its Victims” is not only a 
Gramscian inventory. It also represents, as does Orientalism, the assertion that 
the most powerful and thoroughgoing critique of Zionism is that made by its 
victims. Surely we can say that in Said’s work Palestine and the Palestinians 
represent—in Lukács’s terms—the denial of linear history: that the Palestinians 
find themselves “repeatedly confronted” (Lukács 1971a, 164) with the problem of 
their own point of departure; that Zionism has given Israel and Israelis a powerful 
sense of agency; but that while the Palestinians lack such agency, this very fact 
“forces [them] to surpass the immediacy of [their] situation” (166)? Ultimately, 
is Said not suggesting that Palestinian critical consciousness will bring about 
an “objective structural change in the object of knowledge” of the situation in 
Palestine/Israel (169)? Refracting Said’s work back through Lukács, we realize 
that he is saying nothing less than that Palestinian critical consciousness “is itself 
nothing but the contradictions of history that have become conscious” (178). 
Just as Lukács’s proletariat comes to consciousness as the consciousness of the 
commodity through its objectification, just as it has the potential to attain a 
knowledge of the historical process as a totality, so Said is arguing (if chiefly 
implicitly) that the Palestinians—the reified Other of Zionism—may not only 
articulate but actually embody by their praxis a properly dialectical history of the 
Jewish question as transposed to Palestine: the “question of Palestine.”
In 1984, Said published a long review essay in the London Review of Books 
under the title “Permission to Narrate” (Said 1994, 247–68). This was a lengthy 
consideration of a number of books arising out of the Lebanon war and the 
Beirut camp massacres, most notably Noam Chomsky’s The Fateful Triangle. 
Underpinning Said’s reading and analysis, however, was a linkage of narrative 
and authority. Hayden White, Said points out, argues that “narrative in general, 
from the folk tale to the novel, from annals to the fully realized ‘history,’ has 
to do with the topics of law, legality, legitimacy, or, more generally, authority” 
(White 1987, 13). White notes also that, conventionally, the proper subject of 
historical narrative has been, following Hegel, the state (11–12). Said is interested 
in his essay to note the competition and intertwining of the Israeli and 
Palestinian narratives. Broadly speaking, his point is that the Israeli narrative 
had successfully interdicted the Palestinian one at the time of his writing 
because the Israeli narrative was underpinned by the authority conferred by the 
possession of a state. Said argues that the target of Operation Peace for Galilee 
was the “coherent narrative direction pointed towards self-determination” of 
the Palestinian people with their history, actuality, and aspirations (Said 1994, 
249). Competing against the Zionist narrative of Jewish ingathering, return, 
and redemption has been the Palestinian narrative of dispersion, fragmentation, 
alienation, struggle, and hoped-for return. The Palestinian narrative, Said says, 
“has never been officially admitted to Israeli history, except as that of ‘non-Jews,’ 
whose inert presence in Palestine was a nuisance to be ignored or expelled” (254). 
With the military destruction of the Palestine Liberation Organization in 1982, 
the narrative of the transformation of Palestinians from peasants to refugees to 
revolutionaries “has . . . come to an abrupt stop, curling about itself violently” 
(252). We could reframe this in Lukácsian terms and say that the Zionist narrative 
of Jewish redemption and revival and subjective restoration has necessitated, as 
its dark obverse, the reification, partial destruction, and violent dispersal and 
alienation of the Palestinians from Palestine and from themselves.
A crucial example here for Said is the discourse of “terrorism,” which is capable 
of both absorbing and delegitimating a narrative such as that of the Palestinians:
Terrorism is the biggest and yet for that reason the most precise of concepts. This 
is not at all to say that terrorism does not exist, but rather to suggest that its 
existence has occasioned a whole new signifying system as well. Terrorism signifies 
. . . in relation to “us,” the alien and gratuitously hostile force. It is destructive, 
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systematic, and controlled. It is a web, a network, a conspiracy run from Moscow. 
. . . As such it can be used retrospectively . . . or prospectively . . . to justify 
everything “we” do, and to de-legitimize as well as dehumanize everything “they” 
do. The very indiscriminateness of terrorism, actual and described, its tautological 
and circular character, is anti-narrative. Sequence, the logic of cause and effect as 
between oppressors and victims, opposing pressures—all these vanish inside an 
enveloping cloud called “terrorism.” (Said 1994, 257)
It is easy to see here that the term “terrorism” is both reified and reifying: it is 
itself an example of overused Orwellian Newspeak, a piece of dead language, 
which also unfortunately confers on its users the capacity to dehistoricize, 
denarrativize, decontextualize, objectify, and pulverize all understanding of its 
object. The point here is that societies, nations, oppressed groups need to achieve 
a kind of narrative coherence in order to obtain socio-political prominence 
and legitimacy. The most powerful mechanism yet devised for instituting or 
institutionalizing this narrative is that form of totality called the state. Thus 
Zionism struggled to create a state in Palestine and the Palestinians struggle to 
create a rival state-in-exile, or a state-in-waiting. Further, the established states 
have the power to regulate narratives, this power at its most extreme being that 
of designating groups or ideas that fall outside of the coercive or representational 
capacity of the state as “terrorist” in the manner Said describes. If there is a 
linkage between states and narrative, then an important weapon in the arsenal 
of a state is the capacity to block rival narratives. It was not for nothing that 
the Israel Defense Forces confiscated Palestinian archives in Beirut in 1984. 
But in discourse, the blockage comes in the form of the appellation “terrorism.” 
“Terrorism” is that which has ceased to be rational, logical, sequential, historical, 
causal, linear. “Terrorism,” one might say to turn full circle, is that which is 
outside culture and the state, “the homeless, in short” (Said 1983, 11).
In his last major critical book, Culture and Imperialism, Said’s deployment 
of Lukács and Gramsci has undergone some modifications. This late book is 
more determinedly geographical than any of Said’s earlier work. Said deploys 
Gramsci’s famous theorization of the “Southern Question” as part of his project 
to articulate the grand European line of thought about Weltliteratur and the 
philological tradition, on the one hand, and the insurgent literary and cultural 
voices of the Global South, on the other, into a disjunct unity. Reading the 
essay “On Some Aspects of the Southern Question,” Said takes his example 
from Gramsci’s argument about the need in the early twentieth century for the 
Communist left in Italy not simply to assume the primitivism of the great mass 
of the peasantry of the Mezzogiorno, since to do so was to risk leaving them open 
to the hegemonic capture of an alliance between the northern bourgeoisie and 
southern large landowners, and hence become an anti-revolutionary force. Said’s 
point is that Gramsci recognizes the need for a hegemony to be forged across 
differential political geographies that will be at once coherent, but loose enough 
to allow for the different temporalities, the uneven patterns of development, the 
complexities of modernity, across those spaces, be they spaces of politics or spaces 
of culture (Said 1993, 56–59). Gramsci’s “absolute historicism” (Gramsci 1971, 
465), his recognition of the importance of the question of nationalism, permits 
Said to propose a radicalized model of comparative literature that recognizes 
the relationship between that discipline, the ideal of “world literature,” and 
imperialism while also preserving a critical space for Said to look at the cultures, 
places, and histories that have been occluded by the traditional model.
In this spirit, then, Said invokes the work of Frantz Fanon, the most brilliant 
of decolonizing intellectuals, in his discussion of anti-colonial nationalism and 
resistance culture. Fanon’s work was a blend of Freudianism, Marxism, and 
Sartrean existentialism. But the peculiarity of Said’s manoeuvre is to draw out 
the Lukácsian undertones of Fanon’s posthumous masterpiece, The Wretched of 
the Earth (1961). Said conjectures that Fanon’s book, with its searing analyses of 
colonial and anti-colonial violence and of the rigidities of colonial and even anti-
colonial culture, is partly inspired by Lukács’s model of reification-and-totality. 
This proposal is of a piece with Said’s late essay “Traveling Theory Reconsidered,” 
originally published a year after Culture and Imperialism. There Said suggests that, 
in the hands of Adorno and Fanon, Lukács’s theory is not weakened or tamed—as 
he had suggested was the case with Goldmann’s or Williams’s appropriations of 
it—but rather reignites in new unreconciled inflections (Said 2000, 436–52). In 
Culture and Imperialism, Said suggests that Fanon’s depiction of colonialism is of a 
ruthlessly omnivorous system, which distorts the life of the colonial population 
and territory in every sphere. But against—and because of—this remorseless 
domination, its dialectical opposite emerges: “the insurrectionary native, tired of 
the logic that reduces him, the geography that segregates him, the ontology that 
dehumanizes him, the epistemology that strips him down to an unregenerate 
essence” (Said 1993, 323). Fanon portrays the force of colonialism as precisely 
matched and held by the counterforce of resistance. In the brutally dualistic 
structure that Fanon envisages, Said detects a reinflected version of the subject-
object split that Lukács had suggested was the most profound damage done by 
capitalist reification. Fanon redeploys Lukács’s theory in the colonial space, with 
its reified and demarcated territories, cultures, knowledges, even ontologies. 
What is needed is some kind of dialectical synthesis and movement. For Fanon, 
the totalizing move is insurrectionary violence. Violence is the lightning bolt 
that rejoins the ossified and separated worlds of colonizer and colonized, “white 
man as subject, black man as object” (326). Said then quotes Fanon: 
The appearance of the settler has meant in the terms of syncretism the death of 
the aboriginal society, cultural lethargy, and the petrifaction of individuals. For 
the native, life can only spring up again out of the rotting corpse of the settler. . . . 
But it so happens that for the colonized people this violence, because it constitutes 
their only work, invests their character with positive and creative qualities. The 
practice of violence binds them together as a whole, since each individual forms 
a violent link in the great chain, a part of the great organism of violence. (Fanon 
1967, 73; quoted in Said 1993, 328)
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Fanon’s writing, Said argues, offers a profound radicalization of European theory 
in the colonial setting. It sets out in prose at once eloquent and analytical the 
colonial problematic, portrays the vicissitudes of decolonization, and anticipates, 
in tones of sovereign contempt, the emergence and renewed reifications of the 
thought and actions of the postcolonial bourgeoisie. Fanon also stands, for Said, 
as an example of the intellectual radicalized by his colonial environment. While 
Fanon and Foucault were contemporaries (born only a year apart), Fanon was the 
truly liberating thinker. Where Foucault’s brilliant analytics of power as vested 
in discourse eventually issue in a theoretical over-totalization, and even a kind of 
self-reification of the “specific” intellectual, it is Fanon’s work that thinks Europe 
and the colonies together, moving from confinement and reification to liberation 
(Said 1993, 336).
The argument here has been that, though Said’s appropriations of the ideas of 
Georg Lukács and Antonio Gramsci may have been heterodox and unsystematic, 
these two thinkers gave the Palestinian critic some of the most important 
weapons in his arsenal. Much has been made in discussion of Said, both before 
his death and since, of his alleged eclecticism, his theoretical inconsistencies. A 
more sympathetic and, I would argue, more accurate perspective on this might 
be to say that he used ideas pragmatically—the point was always for thought and 
criticism to be open, to be exposed to other thought and to the “world.” Highly 
elaborated theoretical or philosophical systems are vulnerable to becoming self-
justifying and tautological. With Lukács and Gramsci, Said did more than most 
critical scholars ever do to expose high theory to the world and to return it to its 
once-revolutionary beginnings.
NOTES
This essay began life as a keynote talk at the Tenth Annual Symposium on Comparative 
Literature at Cairo University in December 2010. I am very grateful to Professors Hoda 
Gindi and Nadia El-Kholy for affording me that opportunity, and to David Noonan of the 
Irish Department of Foreign Affairs for facilitating my trip. A later version was presented 
at University College Dublin in February 2011, and I am grateful to Sharae Deckard for 
her invitation and to John Brannigan for his response. I am also more generally indebted 
here to the conversation and ideas of Joe Cleary, Raymond Deane, Declan Kiberd, David 
Lloyd, and Graham MacPhee.
1 For a clearer-eyed account of Auerbach’s (and Leo Spitzer’s) time in Istanbul, see Emily 
Apter’s The Translation Zone: A New Comparative Literature (2005, 41–64).
2 For the motif of the “voyage in”, see Said 1993, 288–316.
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